In 2009 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) estimated that its shell egg rule would reduce illness from Salmonella Enteritidis (SE) by about 79,000 cases annually (37%), with a range from about 30,000 to 191,000 cases avoided. I assess the effectiveness of this rule, which requires farmers who sell eggs to adopt SE control measures, by comparing illness from SE with illness from other Salmonella serotypes, using a differences-in-differences approach. The data reject the hypothesis that the rule reduced illnesses by FDA's best 2009 estimate, but do not reject a hypothesis of no effect. The percentage of young broilers that test positive for SE has a modest effect on the incidence of human cases of salmonellosis caused by SE. Recent literature offers two other reasons to adjust FDA's prospective 2009 calculations. One adjustment would follow the Centers for Disease Control's use of a lower multiplier to infer the total number of (unobserved) cases of illness from those confirmed by positive lab tests. A second adjustment would lower the average cost of Salmonella cases, by recognizing lower risk of severe sequelae. These adjustments and the new retrospective assessment of the effectiveness of the rule together suggest that the benefits of FDA's egg rule may be a small fraction of the prospective estimate of benefits, and less than the prospective estimate of costs. I conclude with some policy recommendations to make food safety regulations more effective.
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Introduction
The 2011 Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) (1) has led the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to issue nine separate economically significant regulations, of which eight have been proposed but not yet issued in final form. (2) FDA is issuing these regulations with very limited information about their cost-effectiveness. In particular, FDA has developed eight of these nine rules without providing any quantitative information about the reduction in human illness that might be expected from promulgation and enforcement of these rules (see Appendix).
In addition, FDA is developing these regulations without any new analysis of the effects of existing food safety regulations. Yet several of these, such as rules mandating hazard analysis of critical control points for juice (3) and for seafood, (4) and FDA's egg rule, (5) are conceptual precursors of the regulations that FDA is developing under the FSMA. An assessment of the effects of extant regulations thus seems germane for current food safety policy decisions.
Retrospective assessments of the effects of federal regulations are a hallmark of two executive orders signed by President Obama (EO 13563 and EO 13610) and features of earlier executive orders going back to President Reagan (EO 12291). Indeed, Section 1(a) of President Obama's EO 13563 states that the regulatory system "must measure, and seek to improve, the actual results of regulatory requirements." Conducting such analysis is typically challenging, however, because of data deficiencies and inadequate quasiexperiments appropriate for drawing causal inferences. (6, 7, 8) In addition, federal regulatory agencies assigned responsibility for retrospective studies by these EOs have little incentive to spend scarce resources on retrospective as opposed to prospective analyses. (9, 8) The literature on food safety includes numerous studies using FoodNet, the active surveillance system of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which is widely thought to be the best source of data on human illnesses from foodborne pathogens. (10, 11) CDC researchers routinely use FoodNet data to report changes in incidence by pathogen, (12) but these  Visiting fellow, Resources for the Future.
reports provide very little quantitative information about the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of different regulatory actions. The CDC also reports aggregate estimates of the public health burden of foodborne illnesses, (10) but without providing either prospective or retrospective quantitative estimates of the reductions in burden attributable to specific rules.
FDA has provided quantitative prospective estimates of the costs, and sometimes of the benefits, of its regulations, but I am unaware of a retrospective analysis that it has completed of the benefits or costs of extant food safety regulations. A minor exception is an FDA statement about an earlier FDA rule addressing refrigeration and labeling of eggs. (5) FDA noted that after that earlier rule took effect in 2001, the estimated number of illnesses from Salmonella Enteritidis in the United States decreased by nearly 9 percent in 2002. 1 FDA did not test the statistical significance of the estimated decline, which is likely subject to confounding anyway.
All of these analyses of foodborne illnesses have to overcome a variety of technical difficulties. Underreporting is generally high, with only a small proportion of illnesses reported to public health authorities or confirmed by laboratory testing. (10) Only a small fraction of illnesses are ever linked to specific pathogens, such as a particular bacterium, virus, or protozoan. Illness linked to a specific pathogen may not have resulted from contaminated food, because transmission can also occur through other means, such as contact with animals or contaminated drinking water. It may also result from consumption of contaminated food during travel to other countries. The multiplicity of pathogens and sources means that linking reductions in disease to regulatory efforts is difficult-the noise drowns out the signal.
This paper seeks to improve understanding of the effectiveness of federal efforts to promote food safety by evaluating retrospectively the effectiveness of controls on a single relatively important pathogen, Salmonella Enteritidis (SE). Salmonella causes more illness than any other pathogen routinely tracked by the CDC, and recent estimates of Salmonella incidence exceed the Healthy People 2020 Goal level of 11.4 cases per 100,000. (12) Among the different serotypes of Salmonella, SE is implicated in more cases of illness than any other. Human exposure is through food, primarily chicken, which is regulated by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) through its Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), and eggs, which are regulated by FDA if they are sold in their shells. FDA issued a major rule in 2009 addressing the safety of so-called "shell eggs" and estimated that it would lead to significant reductions in incidence of human illness from SE. (5) I use CDC's FoodNet database on human cases of foodborne illness to compare the incidence of illness from SE and other pathogens, including other serotypes of Salmonella, before and after implementation of FDA's egg rule. Other serotypes of Salmonella are an appropriate control for SE because they occur commonly in poultry and are influenced by the same risk factors. A key distinction is that SE, unlike all other Salmonella-that is, Salmonella
Non-Enteritidis (SNE)-is introduced into the interior of the egg in ovum. (13) In addition, FDA reported that for outbreaks where a vehicle of transmission of SE was identified, 81 percent of outbreaks and 79 percent of illnesses identified through such outbreaks were attributed to eggs.
Thus infection controls in egg farms are likely to affect predominantly, and perhaps exclusively, the incidence of disease from SE but not from SNE.
Using a differences-in-differences approach, I reject the hypothesis that the rule reduced illness by the amount estimated prospectively by FDA in 2009, but I am unable to reject a hypothesis that the rule had no effect on the incidence of SE. I am able to show a modest effect of the percentage of young broilers that test positive for SE on the incidence of human cases of salmonellosis caused by SE.
I also review the food safety literature since FDA issued its egg rule in 2009 and find two reasons to update or adjust FDA's ex ante calculations in a manner that would result in substantially lower overall benefits. One such adjustment would follow CDC's use of a lower multiplier to infer the total number of (unobserved) cases of illness from those confirmed by positive lab tests. A second adjustment would lower the average cost of Salmonella cases, by recognizing lower risk of severe sequelae. The net effects of both adjustments is a reduction by a factor of four.
These adjustments, when coupled with the new retrospective assessment of reductions in illness, suggest that FDA's prospective benefits estimate was too high by a factor of about 16, although the uncertainty means it could be too high by as little as a factor of 7.. Further, it suggests that net benefits may be positive or negative; FDA in 2009 estimated benefits outweighed costs by a factor of 17.
In the rest of the paper, I provide the history and background of recent federal efforts to promote food safety and a review of FDA's egg rule. Next, I present an analysis of the effect of the rule on human illness. I then provide a discussion of this analysis before concluding and offering some policy recommendations.
History and Background
FDA is developing new food safety regulations without having carefully assessed retrospectively the effects of existing food safety regulations. The FDA website lists more than two dozen retrospective reviews conducted under EO 13563, but just one of these addresses food safety-the modernization of current food Good Manufacturing Practice regulations through a rule mandated by FSMA requiring preventive controls. Figure 1 . A Retrospective Appraisal of Salmonella in the United Kingdom (18) As an example of a retrospective assessment of trends in foodborne illness in the United States, the USDA's Economic Research Service in 2002 linked trends toward safer preparation of hamburgers with small but meaningful reductions in risk of foodborne illness. Specifically, it said, "The change in behavior reported in the 1996 Hamburger Preparation Quiz (HPQ), a national survey of hamburger cooking and ordering preferences, translates to an estimated 4.6-percent lower risk of E. coli O157:H7 infection and an estimated $7.4-million annual reduction in medical costs and productivity losses." (19) This analysis, however, offered merely suggestive links from the change in food safety education to behavior. Moreover, it did not link changes in disease incidence to a federal rule.
The CDC regularly reports trends in incidence of human illness linked to foodborne pathogens. It usually does so without ascribing specific, quantifiable changes in incidence to particular regulatory programs. For example, CDC has recently acknowledged that cases of illness from SE have not been falling as originally forecast. (12) Ongoing efforts to reduce contamination of eggs include FDA's Egg Safety Rule, which requires shell egg producers to implement controls to prevent contamination of eggs on the farm and during storage and transportation. FDA required compliance by all egg producers with ≥50,000 laying hens by 2010 and by producers with ≥3,000 hens by 2012. (12) Enteritidis is the most frequently reported serotype of Salmonella among those isolated in specimens sent to laboratories for analysis. For 2013, Crim et al. report, "Among 6,520 (90%) serotyped Salmonella isolates, the top serotypes were Enteritidis, 1,237 (19%); Typhimurium, 917 (14%); and Newport, 674 (10%)." (12) Salmonella Enteritidis is the most frequently identified serotype of human health significance among young chickens and ground chicken. 
FDA'S Egg Rule
A retrospective appraisal of the effects of FDA's egg rule should build on an understanding of the rule and the supporting analysis. In this section, I summarize the egg rule briefly, review FDA's supporting analysis, and evaluate whether FDA's 2009 estimates of the baseline risk and costs of illness from SE are consistent with current methods.
FDA's Egg Rule
The analysis that FDA conducted to support its 2009 egg rule projected large net benefits, more than $1.3 billion annually, as shown in Table I . (5) FDA estimated that "eventual" benefits, which would accrue starting with the fifth year after the rule took effect, exceeded estimated costs by more than a factor of 17. FDA estimated that the expected value of total costs would be $82 million annually (90 percent CI: $58-$117 million). (5) In its analysis, all the quantified benefits were reductions in risk of illness from SE. Although FDA's egg rule acknowledged that
Campylobacter and Salmonella other than Enteritidis had been found on the exterior of chicken eggs, illness from the presence of pathogens on the exterior of the eggshells seems likely to be rare, and FDA did not expect benefits from reductions in pathogens other than SE to be large.
About 85 percent of this reduction in SE risk came from two key provisions: rodent and pest control and refrigeration. Diversion, a requirement that contaminated eggs be treated so as to achieve a 5 log reduction prior to sale, generates another 14 percent of the projected reduction in illness. It is important to distinguish between two different concepts of incidence, as shown by the CDC's burden of illness pyramid. One relies on culture-confirmed cases. A much larger figure reflects all illnesses, including those without laboratory confirmation of the presence of a pathogen, a specimen collected, or even an effort to seek medical attention. FDA has in the past used a factor of 38 to estimate the total cases of salmonellosis from the number of Salmonella illnesses estimated through a surveillance program. (5) In 2013, the CDC's Salmonella Atlas used 29 total cases of illness for every lab-confirmed reported case. 
Baseline Risks: Observed vs Total Cases of Salmonella Enteritidis
New information about differences between observed and total human cases of 
The Food Safety Inspection Service and SE on Poultry Products
Poultry products may carry different Salmonella serotypes, and human exposure to raw or badly cooked poultry thus creates a risk of illness. In response to a request for data under the In June 2006, FSIS began to schedule establishments based on new criteria that are riskbased. (27) The new scheduling criteria focused FSIS resources on establishments with the most Since FoodNet tracks individual cases of illness, a key question is the preferred unit of observation. More than a third of cases lack information on the date of first onset of symptoms, so a measure of daily counts of illness seems inefficient. Given that the data cover only eight years, a focus on annual observations also seems inefficient. I choose to analyze monthly counts of illness, which are summarized in Table III . I exclude cases of illness where the patient acknowledged having traveled internationally prior to falling ill. In its analysis of FoodNet data, CDC has used negative binomial regressions to estimate I use Model C in Table IV to develop counterfactual estimates of the incidence of labconfirmed SE, making projections for the period after the rule is implemented. As shown in Figure 5 , the projected values track the observed log of incidence of SE fairly well, with one exceptional period.
Figure 5. Monthly Cases of Salmonellosis Attributed to S. Enteritidis
There was an unusually sharp decline in observed cases relative to the forecast cases during the fall of 2012 and the winter of 2012-2013. Since this difference between observed and forecast cases does not persist at a comparable level, however, it is difficult to infer that it is a result of the rule. I am unaware of plausible explanations for this temporary gap between the actual and forecast cases.
I now expand the dataset to include incidence of illnesses from other Salmonella serotypes (as well as SE), thus allowing for a differences-in-differences approach. This approach comes at a cost, however. The large number of serotypes other than Salmonella Enteritidis and the variety of products on which they appear make it difficult to construct a measure comparable to the percentage of broilers that are positive for SE. I instead estimate a regression like Model D in Table IV for the monthly number of all Salmonella non-Enteritidis cases and calculate differences-the observed less the predicted number of cases. Figure 6 shows the observed and the predicted number of cases of SNE. focus on the natural log of incidence (cases per million population); a visual inspection suggests this variable is normally distributed. This set of pairwise differences for ln(incidence of SE) and for ln(incidence of SNE) is summarized in the third row of Table V . I also conduct a similar differences-in-differences analysis using cases of illness from
Campylobacter, which is frequently found on poultry and may be a second appropriate basis for comparison. The FSIS reported that the estimated national prevalence of Salmonella in chicken parts was 24.02 percent, while the estimated national prevalence of Campylobacter in chicken parts was 21.70 percent. (20) Using an approach comparable to the last row of Table V , I estimate that the decline in cases of SE is 5.3 percent with a standard error also equal to 5.3 percent. Thus the decline is not statistically significant, and the upper confidence limit on the effect is about 15.9 percent. Campylobacter may be, however, less appropriate for comparison than Salmonella non-Enteritidis. The two pathogens exhibit different seasonalities. The CDC reports that the local maxima for cases of Campylobacter occur in July rather than in August. (29) In addition, there may be differences between these pathogens in how cases of human illness are acquired. The CDC reports that the percentage of outbreak-related illnesses thought to be foodborne is 81 percent for Campylobacter but only about 74 percent for Salmonella. (29) Thus I prefer to use SNE for comparison, although use of Campylobacter gives qualitatively similar results.
I also estimate two different regressions with a variable for illness from SE and SNE and a differences-in-differences term. Using a negative binomial regression with monthly data for the count of illnesses of SE and SNE. I do not find a statistically significant effect of the egg rule on the count of illness from SE. Specifically, as shown in column A of Table VI, this model gives an estimated reduction of about 0.08, with a standard error of 0.06. Switching instead to the natural log of the incidence of illness, Model B yields an estimate for the effect of the rule on incidence of SE illnesses of -0.0739, with a standard error of 0.0979-also a result that is not statistically different from zero. 
Discussion
FDA's egg rule appears to have had relatively small and statistically insignificant effects on human illness from SE. The standard error for the effect of the egg rule on incidence of SE relative to other Salmonella serotypes is 0.057 in Table IV , suggesting a 95 percent confidence interval extending as high as about 12 percent. The negative binomial regression shown in Table   VI (col A) implies a 95 percent confidence limit of about 20 percent for the reduction in illnesses. Even this reduction is much less than FDA's best estimate of "eventual" reductions in incidence of 37 percent, and below FDA's estimate of "initial" benefits, a 32 percent reduction in illness, although it exceeds FDA's presumptive lower bound, 12 percent. The general result that the effect of FDA's egg rule is relatively small and statistically insignificant appears to be insensitive to a variety of alternative model specifications.
FDA's prospective estimate of the benefits of its final rule appears to be too large for Collectively these three findings suggest that FDA's prospective estimates of benefits were much too large, as shown in Table VII Although this analysis has not focused on a retrospective assessment of the costs of FDA's egg rule, I note that the retrospective estimates of benefits may well be less than the estimates of costs of the rule projected by FDA in 2009. Specifically, FDA estimated that the initial costs were about $88 million annually and the eventual costs were about $81 million annually. The finding that the estimated benefits are below or in the range of the prospective estimates of costs suggests there may be merit in revisiting some policies regarding egg safety. In light of the lack of evidence about the effectiveness of the rule, one might ask whether extant requirements imposed on small farmers are sensible. FDA's 2009 analysis estimated that the compliance costs per farm were quite high for the majority of regulated egg producers, which collectively are responsible for a small share of total egg production. In particular, FDA reported that compliance costs as a percentage of revenue would reach 3.9 percent for the 670 farms with between 20,000 and 50,000 hens and 8 percent for the 1,660 farms with between 3,000 and 20,000 hens. These farms represent more than a majority of all farms covered by the rule but produce only 17 percent of the total amount of egg production regulated by the rule. (5) The real value of this retrospective analysis is in the light that it sheds on the forgone benefits of the rule. The egg rule simply failed to bring about the public health gains that FDA had forecast. Thus it serves as a cautionary note to federal regulators that regulating without careful monitoring and evaluation of the effects of regulations may lead to an undeserved sense of satisfaction. Regulatory success should not merely be the issuance of a new regulation or effective enforcement of a new rule. In addition, it must include an unflinching look at whether the regulation achieved its goals, and if not, what alternative approaches might be more effective, and / or more cost-effective, at doing so. Food safety regulators to date have not hit the mark in this regard. In light of the wave of new food safety regulations expected as part of implementation of FSMA, FDA and other food safety regulators need to be much more attentive to measuring the actual effects of their rules.
Regarding prospective analysis, food safety agencies should focus more on pilot studies and field tests to collect information about the effects of their regulations. These pilot studies and field tests should be rigorous, involving random assignment. They should be comprehensive, covering all key regulatory provisions-that is, those that are key to estimates of costs, effectiveness, or benefits. And they should be thorough, in other words looking not only at the occurrence of the hazard or pathogen but also at changes in risks that matter to people, especially risks related to health and safety. Rules unsupported by such studies should be subject to extra special scrutiny as proposals and draft final rules, by the Department of Health and Human Services, the Office of Management and Budget, and Congress.
At the time a rule is issued, the regulatory agency should also issue a plan to monitor or track its effectiveness-a goal consistent with EO 13563 and the Government Performance and
Results Act. This plan should identify metrics to assess whether the rule is delivering the beneficial effects (or imposing the costs) consistent with prior estimates and lay out specific steps to ensure that those metrics are publicly available on a timely basis. In the case of FDA's egg rule, this plan should have identified an appropriate comparison pathogen, such as SNE, as well as procedures for public access to the FoodNet data. It should also have noted that existing USDA farm surveys are not adequate to make statistical inferences about disproportionately large effects of FDA's egg rule on small egg producers and, accordingly, sought an expansion of USDA's sampling of those farmers, at least for a few critical years. Finally, in light of the relative ease of the differences-in-differences approach pursued here, it should have offered periodic reporting of such results.
Implementing these recommendations would entail resources and effort. But it might help avoid the current situation, where one of the most common foodborne pathogens, emanating from a single specific class of facilities and first targeted by public health officials nearly two decades ago, sickens scores of thousands of Americans annually, without any apparent reaction by policymakers. Perhaps therein lies the key lesson of this retrospective analysis. If regulators do not regularly assess the effects of extant rules, they may wrongly believe that a rule, once issued, has eliminated most of the problem it sought to address, even when a more careful look would point to the opposite conclusion. 
